

Executive Registry
72-517411

OGC 72-1586

26 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. Richard C. Tufaro

AT 1. [REDACTED] and the undersigned met with Mr. Richard C. Tufaro, Staff Assistant to the Chairman of the ICRC, this date, to discuss the additional authorization to the CIA Top Secret classification authorization list. Mr. Tufaro was concerned that this list might exceed the definition contained in Executive Order 11652, Section 2(A)(2) and (3): "The authority to originally classify information or material under this order as "Top Secret" shall be exercised only such officials as the President may designate in writing and by: ... (2) Such of their senior principal deputies and assistants as the heads of such Departments may designate in writing; and (3) Such heads and senior principal deputies and assistants of major elements of such Departments, as the heads of such Departments may designate in writing."

2. It was pointed out to Mr. Tufaro that the majority of the additions were accomplished for the purpose of providing the exemption capability to Office of Communications personnel stationed in remote locations. Mr. Tufaro seemed to recognize the problem but was obviously striving for a solution which would more closely comply with the language of the Executive Order. We offered the possibility of "guideline directives" issued by the Director of Communications which would in effect provide a blanket exemption using his authority for cryptographic information.

3. Mr. Tufaro looked at the basic list (listing by positions only) and seemed quite satisfied that it was being policed.

ADMINISTRATIVE—INTERNAL USE

5. Side discussions were held on the method of control, classification, and putting the information into the system, as well as other requirements of quarterly reporting. Mr. Tufaro seemed quite pleased with our ability to perform these functions readily and easily.

6. After lunch, the undersigned continued discussions with Mr. Tufaro. In these discussions, Mr. Tufaro expressed his feeling that the Agency should have some type of spot check mechanism to review documents for classification abuse. He was not specific on this and I definitely had the impression that his concern was with "window dressing" rather than substance. In the course of our discussion, I took advantage of the Cuban Missile Crisis exhibit to open the question of sources and methods with him. I noted that while some sources might appear obvious, there might very well exist sound intelligence reasons which would not permit their disclosure. As an example, I cited a hypothetical situation where we might be utilizing a second generation human asset and would not want to divulge the fact that the first generation asset had worked for us.

7. Our discussion terminated with my suggestion to Mr. Tufaro that he discontinue his practice of writing letters to the Executive Director on classification abuses and either drop me a note or call me directly. He agreed to this.

8. My assessment after this meeting (aside from the question of Mr. Tufaro's correspondence manners) is that he is terribly ignorant in the field of intelligence; with each visit he becomes a little more aware of the problems and a little less hostile. His main thrust is still to release as much information as we can, but I would predict, if we can all live long enough, that he will eventually understand we can't release any.

ST

[REDACTED]

Special Assistant for Information Control

cc:

[REDACTED]

GC

Mr. Eisenbeiss, D/CRS
GFD:bec

Orig - SAIC file via Mr. Colby

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1 - cc as stated